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[SCREW] AMERICA’S PASTIME ACT: THE MIRAGE OF SAPA & 
MINOR LEAGUE BASEBALL WAGES 
John Brucker* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The dream of becoming a professional baseball player is an 
aspiration as all-American as the sport itself.  And while baseball and hot 
dogs are a timeless duo, it is unsurprising that few young people are as 
enchanted by the prospect of becoming a professional hot dog vendor.  
Curiously, though, in all but a select few professional ballparks, the hot 
dog vendor actually makes more money than the ballplayer.1  Jeremy 
Wolf, a minor league baseball player formerly in the New York Mets 
organization, attests, “I was paid $45 per game . . . $3 [per] hour for 70 
hours a week . . . I played in front of 8,000 people [each] night and went 
to bed hungry.  [A]fter seven months of work, I left with less money than 
I started . . . .”2   
Be that as it may, Major League Baseball (MLB), for its part, 
presides over this puzzling reality as puppeteer.3  Players at the MLB 
level earn astounding wealth; however, members of a major league 
team’s minor leagues—the multi-tiered system below it that employs 
thousands of Minor League Baseball (MiLB) players who form the 
lifeblood of an organization’s future—fight to pay rent and eat a decent 
meal, all while vying rigorously for a promotion to MLB.  Because of the 
inherent symbiosis between MLB and MiLB, the wage disparity between 
the two entities defies common sense, but not logic: MLB is a business 
and a good one at that.   
 
*J.D. Candidate, 2021, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., Marist College. 
 1 Pat Garofalo, The MLB Makes Millions on Minor Leaguers. It Refuses to Pay 
Minimum Wage., TALK POVERTY (Feb. 14, 2019), https://talkpoverty.org/2019/02/14/
mlb-makes-millions-minor-leaguers-refuses-pay-minimum-wage. 
 2 Jeremy Wolf, I’ve Lived My Dream, BASEBALL & BUSINESS (June 6, 2018), 
https://www.baseballandbusiness.com/ive-lived-my-dream. 
 3 See id. (“Minor league baseball players work in a system that is fraught with 
corruption; billionaire team owners collectively suppress wages of their lowest 
employees, won’t let them build a union, and won’t let them talk with team officials 
about their treatment.  Whereas, [MiLB] owners profit off of free labor, use public money 
to build gaudy stadiums, and neglect to spend the money on the well being of the players, 
the entertainment.”). 
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Conceived as a “survival-of-the-fittest” proving ground, MiLB 
fosters ultra-competitive playing mentalities that, in theory, churn out 
the best players.  There is a fundamental difference, however, between 
athletic-Darwinism and downright impoverishment.  An ongoing class 
action lawsuit, Senne v. Kansas City Royals, has illuminated the contours 
of baseball’s wage war between MiLB players and MLB owners.4  
Unfortunately, a federal law titled “Save America’s Pastime Act” (SAPA) 
was subsequently enacted and now stands as a formidable obstacle for 
players contesting the low wages through Senne or in other fora.  Hence, 
the future and role of baseball’s minor league system, as a whole, has 
been thrown in flux. 
This Comment establishes that SAPA does not “save” any aspect of 
professional baseball and, in fact, actually obstructs major avenues of it.  
Specifically, Part II lays the groundwork of this country’s professional 
baseball landscape to give the reader a sense of what the life of a 
professional player outside the purview of MLB really entails.  Part III 
details the applicable labor and employment law that has long governed 
all tracks of professional baseball as well as the rise and fall of Senne.  
Part IV delves into SAPA and its impact on Senne, and Part V explores 
projections relative to each in forecasting the sport’s future.  Finally, 
Part VI concludes. 
II.  THE PROFESSIONAL BASEBALL LANDSCAPE 
All players striving to reach the pinnacle of professional baseball in 
this country—universally regarded as MLB—must first run the gauntlet 
that is minor league baseball.  Two separate tracks of minor league 
baseball exist: “affiliated” and “independent.”  Though there are cultural 
and structural distinctions between each track, the same laws uniformly 
govern compensation, and players feel the brunt of them in either 
setting—but, as this Comment will illustrate, to varying degrees. 
A.  The “Affiliated” State of Affairs 
There are thirty MLB teams and each one sponsors several minor 
league feeder-teams below it.  Sponsored MiLB teams are organized into 
classes roughly reflecting the skill level and experience of the players; 
typically, the classes are labeled, in escalating order, “rookie level,” “A,” 
“AA,” and “AAA.”5  The relationship between MLB and MiLB is governed 
by Player Development Contracts, which are agreements between MLB 
and MiLB organizations to affiliate with one another for a certain 
 
 4 See Senne v. Kan. City Royals Baseball Corp., 934 F.3d 918 (9th Cir. 2019).  
 5 Senne v. Kan. City Royals Baseball Corp., 105 F. Supp. 3d 981, 991 (N.D. Cal. 2015). 
BRUCKER (DO NOT DELETE) 11/5/2020  10:25 PM 
2020] COMMENT 519 
period.6  MiLB teams who enter this agreement are colloquially known 
as “affiliated.” 
MLB rules require that its affiliated MiLB teams issue the same 
Uniform Player Contract (UPC) to every minor league player.7  Under the 
UPC, players receive a salary during the playing season only (which lasts 
approximately half a year) and are uncompensated during the 
remainder of the year.8  Still, the UPC imposes duties and obligations 
that “continue in full force throughout the calendar year,” mandating a 
strenuous off-season conditioning regimen, unpaid participation in 
preseason spring training,9 and, for some, postseason instructional 
leagues or winter leagues.10  “MLB has long taken the position that 
minor league baseball is not intended to be a career, but a “short-term 
seasonal apprenticeship” on the way (hopefully) to [reaching MLB].”11  
Accordingly, MiLB contracts trigger compensation for just half the year 
while imposing year-round responsibilities and stints of mandatory 
unpaid labor.12  
The incongruities between MLB and MiLB player contracts are 
staggering.  While MLB revenue reached a record high in 2018 at $10.3 
billion,13 the average affiliated MiLB player is still paid less than $7,500 
per year14—significantly below the national poverty line.15  Typically, a 
first-year player under the UPC earns a fixed salary of $1,100 per month, 
while a more senior player who has reached the upper levels of the 
 
 6 Id. 
 7 Id. 
 8 Id. (emphasis added). 
 9 Garofalo, supra note 1 (“Each year, every major league team has their minor 
league players report to spring training.  Most fans don’t know those minor league 
players have to work 31 straight days for no pay . . . .  If you’re requiring someone to 
work, you should be paying them the minimum wage.  It’s a fairly basic principle.”). 
 10 Id. 
 11 Mitchell Williams, Saving America’s Pastime Means Not Paying Minor League 
Players, JDSUPRA (Jan. 25, 2019), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/saving-america-
s-pastime-means-not-45220. 
 12 Id. 
 13 Maury Brown, MLB Sees Record Revenues of $10.3 Billion for 2018, FORBES (Jan. 7, 
2019, 3:31 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/maurybrown/2019/01/07/mlb-sees-
record-revenues-of-10-3-billion-for-2018/#5d9168f75bea. 
 14 Maury Brown, Minimum Wage Exemption Is the Culmination of a Battle Over MLB 
and Minor League Economics, FORBES (Mar. 26, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
maurybrown/2018/03/26/the-fragile-economics-between-mlb-the-minors-and-the-
minimum-wage-exemption/#7731b7f63c21. 
 15 Bill Baer, Blue Jays’ Minor League Pay Raises Making a Difference, NBC SPORTS (Aug. 
22, 2019, 3:42 PM), https://mlb.nbcsports.com/2019/08/22/blue-jays-minor-league-
pay-raises-making-a-difference. 
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minor leagues can negotiate for slightly more.16  For comparison, the 
annual salary of an MLB player ranges from $550,000, the league 
minimum, to $42 million, the highest amount per season.17  Moreover, 
MLB safeguards its wealth through unionization: the MLB Players 
Association.18  Despite a binding UPC agreement issued by the MLB 
itself, MiLB players are excluded from union representation—further 
evidence of the incongruity between the two entities.19   
This Comment does not advocate for wages anywhere near that of 
MLB, but simply for minor league wages to exceed the national poverty 
level and represent a fair, living wage in exchange for services that MLB 
exclusively oversees.  The first-year UPC rate—$1,100 per month—
serves as the basis for this argument. 
B.  Across the Ledger: An “Independent” Look   
In addition to affiliated professional baseball, there is a companion 
track: independent professional baseball (sometimes referred to as 
“Indy Ball”).  An independent professional team, as the name indicates, 
is independently owned and operated for profit outside the ambit of 
MLB and often has “much less cash to go around.”20  There is, however, 
significant crossover between many of the players in the affiliated and 
independent professional ranks.21 
Indy Ball notoriously serves one of two functions for a professional 
player: either a springboard or a safety-net.  If a player is not on the 
radar of an MLB team, he may prove himself in an independent league 
with the hope that his contract is purchased by an affiliate of MLB.  Or, 
if a player is released from the affiliated ranks for any number of reasons 
(commonly as a result of nonperformance, an injury, age, or a failed drug 
 
 16 Ronald Blum, Baseball Players in Minors to Lose Minimum Wage Protection, AP 
NEWS (Mar. 23, 2018), https://www.apnews.com/cb183f59e88948e8b9cd49ad07bd
e807. 
 17 USA TODAY, https://www.usatoday.com/sports/mlb/salaries (last visited Sep. 16, 
2020). 
 18 Mike Axisa, Congress’ ‘Save America’s Pastime Act’ Would Allow Teams to Pay 
Minor-Leaguers Less Than Minimum Wage, CBS SPORTS (Mar. 22, 2018), https://www.cbs
sports.com/mlb/news/congress-save-americas-pastime-act-would-allow-teams-to-
pay-minor-leaguers-less-than-minimum-wage. 
 19 See id. 
 20 Bill Baer, Ever Wonder How Much Money an Independent League Player Makes?, 
NBC SPORTS (Jan. 23, 2018, 4:16 PM), https://mlb.nbcsports.com/2018/01/23/ever-
wonder-how-much-money-an-independent-league-player-makes. 
 21 J.J. Cooper, Sources: MiLB Ready to Agree to Significant Reduction in Teams, 
BASEBALL AM. (Apr. 21, 2020), https://www.baseballamerica.com/stories/sources-milb-
ready-to-agree-to-significant-reduction-in-teams (discussing the possibility that certain 
independent league teams may actually be “added to affiliated ball”). 
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test), he may continue his career in the independent circuit and aim to 
return to the affiliated side of the ledger.22  And because the affiliated 
system is intentionally set up for high turnover, the utility of its 
independent counterpart is especially relevant. 
Though the affiliated track is the leading vehicle to MLB stardom, 
the independent track’s rich history and successes make it a viable 
“Plan-B” for certain players or situations.  For instance, the safety-net 
function is seen in the Atlantic League, as it showcases a culture of 
accomplished, veteran talent in which 40% boast of previous MLB 
experience—a number far exceeding any affiliated MiLB organization.23  
Another independent league, the Frontier League, exhibits the 
springboard function through a much younger demographic of 
players—often players who are undrafted and begin their career 
there—but of which hundreds have had their contracts purchased by an 
affiliated MiLB organization, and thirty-eight have reached MLB.24  
While the probability of any player in either track reaching MLB is 
statistically low (as is customary of the sport), the functions of Indy Ball 
prove a valued complement to the affiliated system. 
III.  THE LEGISLATIVE & JUDICIAL FRAMEWORKS 
The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) establishes the federal 
minimum wage, $7.25 per hour, and is the foundation of any wage 
disparity analysis.25  The FLSA regulates the compensation of 135 
million workers, both full and part-time, in the private and public 
sectors.26  While the federal minimum wage is based on a standard 40-
hour workweek, the FLSA also requires premium overtime pay in the 
event an employee exceeds that total.27  As long as an employee is at 
least sixteen-years-old, there is no limit to the hours in a day or the 
number of days in a week that an employer may require an employee to 
work.28  And when a protected employee exceeds the forty-hour 
 
 22 Jeff Zimmerman, Independent League to Affiliated Baseball: Who Makes the Move?, 
THE HARDBALL TIMES (Feb. 12, 2016), https://tht.fangraphs.com/independent-league-to-
affiliated-baseball-who-makes-the-move (“In-season acquisitions cost a major league 
team $4,000, with $3,000 going to the independent league team and $1,000 to the 
league.”). 
 23 About Us, ATLANTIC LEAGUE, http://www.atlanticleague.com/about-us/about-us. 
 24 Alumni, FRONTIER LEAGUE, http://frontierleague.com/alumni. 
 25 Wages and the Fair Labor Standards Act, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, https://www.dol.gov/
agencies/whd/flsa.  There are also state minimum wage claims to be made, which will 
be introduced and explored to follow. 
 26 Who Is Covered, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, https://webapps.dol.gov/elaws/elg/min
wage.htm#who. 
 27 Id. 
 28 Id. 
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threshold, he is entitled to “one and one half times [the] regular rate of 
pay for all hours worked in excess.”29 
Nonetheless, the FLSA specifies exemptions for employees of 
certain establishments and in certain occupations,30 to which minor 
league baseball is no stranger.  Section 213(a)(3) states the following 
exemption(s) from minimum wage and overtime compensation:  
“[A]ny employee employed by an establishment which is an 
amusement or recreational establishment” is exempt from 
federal minimum wage and overtime provisions if “(A) it does 
not operate for more than seven months in any calendar year[;] 
or, (B) during the preceding calendar year, its average receipts 
for any six months of such year were not more than 33-1/3 
per centum of its average receipts for the other six months of 
such year.”31   
Generally speaking, and as will be further expounded upon, because a 
minor league baseball season does not last longer than the allotted 
seven calendar months (typically only five months—April through 
August), teams are exempt from minimum wage and overtime lawsuits 
brought by players (hereinafter described as the Seasonal Exemption).32   
Such immunity, however, contradicts the original legislative intent 
of the law.  The FLSA’s Seasonal Exemption was initially intended to 
apply to, namely, “concessionaires at amusement parks and beaches.”33  
The traditional rationale for the Seasonal Exemption paid homage to 
“the archetypal seasonal amusement or recreational establishment [as 
being] seasonal in the climatological sense of the word, in that it was 
highly weather-dependent.”34  It was also “designed ‘to allow 
recreational facilities to employ young people on a seasonal basis.’”35  
Indeed, baseball remains a predominantly warm-weather game, and 
many stadiums rely considerably on part-time employees, such as 
college students home for the summer, to run concessions and fill off-
field positions.  But the exemption seems almost offensively 
 
 29 Id. 
 30 U.S. Department of Labor, Wage and Hour Division, Fact Sheet #18: Section 13(a)(3) 
Exemption for Seasonal Amusement or Recreational Establishments Under the Fair Labor 
Standards Act (FLSA), U.S. WAGE AND HOUR DIVISION (Revised July 2008), 
https://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/whdfs18.pdf. 
 31 The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(3)(A) and (B) (2018) 
(emphasis added). 
 32 See Charlotte S. Alexander & Nathaniel Grow, Gaming the System: The Exemption 
of Professional Sports Teams from the Fair Labor Standards Act, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 123, 
127 (2015). 
 33 Id. at 133–34. 
 34 Id. at 136. 
 35 Id.  
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inconsistent with the modern realities of the sport’s main attraction: the 
players.  Today, professional players continue to train and remain 
employed by their respective teams year round, and the teams 
employing them operate the business for all twelve months of the year.  
Baseball playing seasons are seasonal, but baseball organizations are 
not. 
This dichotomy proves a controversial analysis under the Seasonal 
Exemption.36  Any two courts assessing the Seasonal Exemption may 
agree that an organization provides an exemption-worthy recreational 
service but disagree as to the extent of its seasonality.37  In Jeffrey v. 
Sarasota White Sox, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the Sarasota 
White Sox, an MiLB team, could cite to the Seasonal Exemption because 
the nature of its business (i.e., its main feature) was the baseball playing 
season alone—a de facto “loss” in the players’ quest for increased 
compensation.38  Just a few years later, however, in Bridewell v. 
Cincinnati Reds, the Sixth Circuit, focusing less on the nature of the 
business’s core function (i.e., length of the playing season), took a 
broader view of the organization’s entire operations, including its off-
season business presence, and deemed the team non-exempt—a “win” 
for the players.39 
Nearly two decades passed without a federal court hearing another 
baseball-related wage complaint before the inaugural filing of Senne v. 
Kansas City Royals in 2015, a class action brought prior to SAPA that 
challenged the hotly-contested Seasonal Exemption.40  Spearheading 
the litigation, Garrett Broshuis, Esq., a young attorney and former MiLB 
player with playing experience at every level of the minor league 
system,41 humanized and lent credence to the issue.42  Importantly, 
Broshuis lived and experienced firsthand the plight complained of: that 
despite so many minor leaguers proving unable to ascend to MLB, every 
 
 36 Id. at 140; see id. at 153. 
 37 Alexander & Grow, supra note 32, at 154. 
 38 See Jeffery v. Sarasota White Sox, 64 F.3d 590, 596–97 (11th Cir. 1995); see also 
Adams v. Detroit Tigers, 961 F. Supp. 176, 181 (E.D. Mich. 1997) (“Tiger Stadium does 
not offer recreation or amusement, i.e., does not ‘operate,’ for more than seven months 
in a year.  Thus, the Tigers are exempt from Michigan wage and hour laws.”).  
 39 See Bridewell v. Cincinnati Reds, 155 F.3d 828, 832 (6th Cir. 1998). 
 40 See Senne v. Kan. City Royals Baseball Corp., 114 F. Supp. 3d 906, 908 (N.D. Cal. 
2015). 
 41 See Bill Shaikin, Minor Leaguers Could be Paid Minimum Wage—And No More, L.A. 
TIMES (Mar. 23, 2018, 10:44 AM), https://www.latimes.com/sports/mlb/la-sp-minor-
league-baseball-wage-20180323-story.html.  
 42 Garrett Broshuis, Players, BASEBALL REFERENCE, https://www.baseball-
reference.com/register/player.fcgi?id=broshu001gar. 
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player deserves to be fairly compensated in the pursuit.43  To that end, 
Senne aims to “reverse the tide of [MiLB’s] unlivable wages” and, at last, 
“impose a just system of pay.”44   
The plaintiffs in Senne, beginning as a single class of forty-five 
minor league players, brought a trio of claims under the federal FLSA 
and state wage-and-hour laws of California, Arizona, and Florida.45  They 
alleged the following: (1) MLB does not pay the players at all during 
spring training, extended spring training, or in the instructional leagues; 
(2) players should qualify as protected employees and no longer be 
labeled as exemption-worthy apprentices under the FLSA; and (3) 
players should be paid overtime for routinely exceeding the forty-hour 
workweek with compensable activities.46  Unfortunately for players, 
complicated choice-of-law and forum-related questions surfaced and 
quickly halted the momentum.47  These considerations led to an 
extensive retooling of the complaint, as well as the formation of pivotal 
sub-classes as the suit progressed.48  The players filed a Second 
Amended Complaint and a collective action was preliminarily certified 
in October of 2015; thousands of players with a stake in the litigation 
 
 43 Shaikin, supra note 41. 
As a freshman at the University of Missouri, Max Scherzer was not 
the most effective pitcher on his team.  A senior named Garrett 
Broshuis went 11–0.  Scherzer became a first-round draft pick, threw 
two no-hitters, won three Cy Young awards and signed a contract 
that guarantees him $210 million.  The Broshuis story is much more 
common.  He became a fifth-round pick, spent six years in the minor 
leagues and zero days in the major league.  Millions were but a dream.  
Broshuis went back to school.  He got a law degree.  In 2014, his firm 
filed a lawsuit that demanded minor leaguers be paid the minimum 
wage.  The suit is ongoing.  
This suit, of course, is Senne. 
 44 Blake Yagman, Senne v. Royals Is the Case that Could Change Major League 
Baseball, FANSIDED (Oct. 25, 2017), https://fansided.com/2017/10/25/senne-v-royals-
lawsuit-could-change-mlb.  
 45 Id.  Of note, the lead plaintiff is Aaron Senne, a former minor leaguer who was 
drafted multiple times, first by the Minnesota Twins and later by the (then) Florida 
Marlins.  Id.  Senne was unable to support his wife and children on his MiLB salary alone 
(“$3,000 for the entire 2010 season, $3,000 in 2011, about $7,000 in 2012, and $3,000 
in 2013”), was “forced to take on additional jobs,” and eventually retired in 2013, 
initiating this lawsuit in 2014.  Id. 
 46 Senne v. Kan. City Royals Baseball Corp., 934 F.3d 918, 924 (9th Cir. 2019). 
 47 Id. at 951 (Ikuta, J., dissenting) (“The proposed classes here comprise employees 
who reside in at least 19 states, who are suing employers who are headquartered in at 
least 22 states, relating to work that took place in three different states . . . .  No wonder 
the district court concluded that consideration of the plaintiffs’ claims on a classwide 
basis would be overwhelmed by individualized choice-of-law inquiries.”). 
 48 Id. at 924–26.  
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received notice of suit, and a whopping 2,200 opted in and joined the 
cause.49   
Thoroughly unnerved by the traction of Senne, and only 
exasperated by the increased media attention and obvious financial 
repercussions of an aggregation of claims, MLB went on the offensive in 
2016.  The league moved to de-certify the players’ collective action, and, 
in response, the players doubled-down in moving to certify a Rule 
23(b)(2) class and a multitude of Rule 23(b)(3) state classes.50  At this 
time, neither the players’ Rule 23(b)(2) class nor their series of Rule 
23(b)(3) state classes gained certification, and their collective action 
was thwarted by de-certification.51  The players had failed to prove the 
required predominance, a similarly situated nature, and standing—a big 
win for MLB.52   
The players “moved for reconsideration, narrowing [the scope of] 
their proposed classes significantly in response to the concerns the 
district court expressed,” introducing four current players to cure the 
standing dilemma and issuing a widespread expert survey, all in the 
hopes of propelling a novel “continuous workday” theory and gaining 
certification.53  The district court found evidentiary value in the survey 
and deemed it sufficient to satisfy the previously missing predominance 
and similarly situated requirements, thereby re-certifying the FLSA 
collective action and certifying a California class.54  Nonetheless, it 
denied certification to the Arizona, Florida, and (b)(2) classes, finding 
that the “choice-of-law concerns [still] defeated predominance for the 
[state] classes and undermined ‘cohesiveness’ for the (b)(2) class.”55   
While this ebb and flow of litigation ensued, MLB aggressively 
lobbied to counteract the claims and greatly diminish the merits of 
Senne.  With its efforts culminating in the enactment of SAPA, MLB 
managed to do just that.  
 
 49 Id. at 924. 
 50 Id. 
 51 Id. at 924–26. 
 52 Senne, 934 F.3d at 925. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Id. at 926. 
 55 Id. 
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IV.  THE SAPA “ROADBLOCK” 
A.  SAPA: Language & Rationale 
Congress enacted SAPA “to clarify certain requirements under the 
[FLSA]”56 and completely insulate MLB from pay-practice legal 
challenges brought by its minor league players—undeniably stemming 
from Senne, which featured large-scale backing from players and unique 
leadership at its helm.  The language of SAPA is as follows: 
[A]ny employee employed to play baseball who is 
compensated pursuant to a contract that provides for weekly 
salary of services performed during the league’s 
championship season (but not spring training or the off 
season) at a rate that is not less than a weekly salary equal to 
the minimum wage under section 6(a) for a workweek of 40 
hours, irrespective of the number of hours the employee 
devotes to baseball related activities.57 
Read in conjunction with the foundational FLSA, SAPA provides teams 
with a safe harbor to a federal minimum wage and bars all professional 
players from qualifying for overtime pay.58  Of course, the bulk of 
compensation a professional player misses out on as a non-protected 
employee is overtime—not minimum wage.  When accounting for all the 
constituent activities born of playing games (i.e., practices, workouts, 
and traveling, to name a few), the time spent greatly exceeds the forty-
hour per week benchmark.59  
SAPA, though, only fortifies the Seasonal Exemption.  Instead of 
continuing to rely on the questionable notion that players are seasonal 
apprentices and not actual workers,60 MLB decided to “rewrite the law 
to explicitly say so.”61  Though it concedes federal minimum wage, SAPA 
reinforces MLB’s long-held administrative argument that minor league 
 
 56 Save America’s Pastime Act, H.R. Con. Res. 5580, 114th Cong. (2018). 
 57 Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2018, H.R. Res. 1625, 115th Cong. (2018) 
(enacted). 
 58 The federal wage and overtime restraints are constricting, but state wage and 
overtime laws are separate and distinct.  This Comment hopes to serve as a catalyst for 
future state-driven pursuits toward fair compensation. 
 59 Senne, 934 F.3d at 923–24 (“For example, a team spring training schedule for one 
of the San Francisco Giants’ affiliates describes that at 6:30 AM, there was an ‘Early Van 
for Treatment and Early Work’; at 7:00 AM, the ‘Regular Van’ departed; at 7:45 AM, the 
‘Early Work’ begin; and then between 9:00 AM and 11:00 AM, the team would perform 
activities such as ‘Stretch,’ ‘Throwing Program,’ and ‘Batting Practice.’  Lunch was to be 
at 11:00 AM, before a 12:10 PM bus to a neighboring city for a 1:00 PM away game.”) 
(footnote omitted). 
 60 Shaikin, supra note 41. 
 61 See id.  
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players should be precluded from the benefits received by non-exempt 
employees under the FLSA because of the incalculable nature of a 
baseball player’s hours.62  Broshuis contends, however, that the 
calculation of hours argument—i.e., the inability of players to clock in 
and out of the job, in a factory-like manner63—is a ploy to justify minor 
leaguers receiving an unfair wage.64  In practice, SAPA marginally 
increases the salary of an affiliated player subject to the baseline $1,100 
per month to the federal minimum wage of $1,160; the downside, of 
course, is an outright capping of federal dollars at that amount, deflating 
the principal aim of Senne to receive a wage indicative of the actual 
hours being worked.65  Players continue to work overtime-worthy 
hours, but SAPA disrupts the efficacy of bringing suit.   
MLB’s campaign in support of SAPA was riddled with deception.66  
“Flex[ing its] political muscle . . . and get[ting] things done in secret that 
benefit only [itself],” MLB lobbied for the law in a covert and rushed 
manner.67  Ultimately found on page 1,967 of the 2,232-page omnibus 
spending bill passed by Congress in March of 2019, SAPA’s 
inconspicuous placement, too, connotes underhandedness.68  The law 
also championed a patently misleading rationale: that without SAPA, 
MiLB teams would be forced to make drastic budgetary cuts, 
threatening their existence and, as a result, hurting the economy in cities 
where they play.69  In essence, MLB cloaked itself with the distorted 
motif that it was acting as a vigilante of minor league baseball, expressly 
declaring that SAPA was saving teams from destruction—even though 
MLB, not MiLB, pays the salaries of its affiliated players by way of the 
UPC.  MLB, in an attempt to authorize this misnomer, reasoned that 
paying every minor leaguer the wages sought in Senne would force it to 
 
 62 Id. (“Where are [we] going to put the time clock?  Who is punching in and out?  
When I decide I want to go to work out and lift weights, is that overtime?  What if I decide 
I want to take extra batting practice?”). 
 63 Id. (“Not everybody works in a factory anymore,” [Broshuis] said.  “Industries of 
all different types have figured out a way to comply with wage and hour laws.  MLB can 
find a way to do it.  They are sophisticated businessmen.”). 
 64 Id.  
 65 Marc Normandin, Why Congress Killing Independent Baseball Is Actually Good, SB 
NATION (Mar. 26, 2018), https://www.sbnation.com/mlb/2018/3/26/17136192/
congress-mlb-spending-bill. 
 66 Blum, supra note 16 (stating that, according to the nonpartisan Center for 
Responsive Politics, the MLB spent $1.32 million on lobbying expenses in both 2016 and 
2017, up from the $330,000 total spent in 2015). 
 67 Id. 
 68 See Save America’s Pastime Act, H.R. Con. Res. 5580, 114th Cong. (2018). 
 69 See generally Blum, supra note 16.  In turn, we find that SAPA threatens precisely 
this with respect to independent professional teams. 
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ask its affiliates to contribute to their players’ salaries, putting them out 
of business entirely.70   
Basic accounting renders that reasoning ill-founded.  At any given 
moment during the season, there are roughly 4,500 active players on 
affiliated minor league rosters nationwide.71  Paying each player, say, an 
extra $300 per month to fairly compensate him for his time equates to, 
roughly, $8,000,000 in total per season72—the equivalent of one-third 
of the amount the Atlanta Braves paid one of its MLB players to suit up 
and play for another team in 2019.73  Furthermore, teams paid 
$4,500,000 for “one average major leaguer” in 201874—the equivalent 
of one MLB team paying two hundred MiLB players the federal 
minimum wage for twelve months.75  SAPA grants minimum wage for 
just the half-year playing season,76 yet paying players “at least minimum 
wage all year round would barely put a dent in [MLB’s] bottom line.”77  
Even so, MLB Commissioner Rob Manfred is adamant that “[MiLB] 
would not exist were it not for the fact that [MLB] subsidizes player 
costs, to the tune of several hundred million dollars a year.”78  SAPA, 
then, reads as an expression of MLB’s belief that it is already paying out 
more money to MiLB than MLB thinks it is worth.  Through SAPA, MLB 
can simultaneously keep those current subsidies relatively stable and 
splinter the initiative of Senne.79 
B.  The Bittersweet Certification of Senne  
The Senne litigation seeks a fair wage; that is, the minimum wage 
coupled with the overtime pay and benefits granted to a protected 
employee under the FLSA.80  Unfortunately, by capping the federal 
compensation of minor league professional baseball players, SAPA 
hampers future wage litigation and endangers any active lawsuit.81  
 
 70 Axisa, supra note 18. 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. 
 73 Id. (explaining how the Atlanta Braves ended up paying Adrian Gonzales over 20 
million dollars to play for the New York Mets—a divisional rival, no less—in 2018). 
 74 Garofalo, supra note 1. 
 75 Id.  
 76 Id. (stating that SAPA “explicitly [says] players are only paid for 40 hours of work 
during the season ‘irrespective of the number of hours the employee devotes to baseball 
related activities,’ and that players don’t need to be paid for spring training or the off 
season”). 
 77 Id. (emphasis added). 
 78 Shaikin, supra note 41. 
 79 Id. 
 80 See id.  
 81 Normandin, supra note 65. 
BRUCKER (DO NOT DELETE) 11/5/2020  10:25 PM 
2020] COMMENT 529 
Players are now subject to the federal minimum wage of $7.25 per hour 
for a forty-hour workweek,82 but it is “the most hollow of victories” 
without any possibility of the valuable benefits from FLSA non-
exemption in its entirety.83  
Although SAPA appears to shield MLB from disputes regarding 
federal wage law, it does not preempt state-law based claims.  
Accordingly, Senne’s objective to obtain a fair wage, post-SAPA, hinges 
on the success of its state class actions: California, Arizona, and Florida.84  
On appeal, the players petitioned for review of the uncertified Arizona 
and Florida classes, while MLB challenged the district court’s 
certification of the California class.85  The Ninth Circuit, “call[ing] a great 
number of balls and strikes,”86 affirmed in part and reversed in part,87 
resulting in a favorable outcome for the players despite the persistence 
of MLB to this point.  The court affirmed the California class’s 
certification and reversed as to the Arizona and Florida classes, 
certifying each.88   
Unbeknownst to most minor league players, an employee subject 
to both state and federal minimum wage laws may be entitled to the 
higher of the two.89  The three state classes in Senne were assembled in 
accord with that premise: Florida’s minimum wage is $8.56 per hour; 
Arizona’s is $12.00; and California’s is $13.00—each higher than the 
federal minimum wage, and significantly so in Arizona and California.90  
Thus, for instance, an affiliated player receiving California’s minimum 
wage would earn a monthly salary of $1,760—a seven hundred dollar 
raise—simply by skirting SAPA.91  And, fortunately for players, state 
minimum wages continue to rise; the lowest earners in twenty-four 
states saw “pay bump[s]” in 2020, and other states are slated to provide 
 
 82 Shaikin, supra note 41. 
 83 Id.  
 84 Senne, 934 F.3d at 926. 
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. at 927. 
 87 Id. at 950. 
 88 Id. at 927–51. 
 89 Minimum Wage, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, https://www.dol.gov/general/topic/wages/
minimumwage. 
 90 See State Minimum Wage Laws, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, https://www.dol.gov/
agencies/whd/minimum-wage/state; see also Andrew Soergel, 24 U.S. States Will See a 
Minimum Wage Increase in 2020, U.S. NEWS (Jan. 2, 2010), https://www.usnews.com/
news/articles/best-states/minimum-wage-by-state.  
 91 See Soergel, supra note 90. 
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similar boosts in the coming years.92  So long as players claim a “home” 
state—i.e., that their labor is performed in just a single state—they 
should be eligible to receive that higher state payout.  
While it is true that interstate traveling is commonplace in 
professional baseball,93 the state classes constructed in Senne are 
deliberately intrastate.  Hence, any concerns of blurring or misapplying 
the applicable state wage laws are surely “overstated.”94  The California 
class consists solely of players in the California League, playing 
exclusively within the confines of California throughout the entire 
playing season.95  And the California League is unorthodox in that 
regard—a professional league regularly consists of teams from 
numerous states, not one.96  This concept of singularity holds true in the 
Arizona and Florida classes as well.97  Those classes consist of players 
who remain in either Arizona or Florida, respectively, for the entirety of 
the services sued upon.98  Thus, MLB cannot assert the alleged 
“administrative cost involved in attempting to comply with a patchwork 
of multiple states’ wage laws” as an argument for de-certification 
because these classes were strategically engineered to avoid such a 
complication.99   
Though the upshot of each class differs, all three are useful.  The 
California class is potentially the most profitable because, in addition to 
California’s higher minimum wage, players seek greater compensation 
for the entire playing season.100  The Florida and Arizona classes do not 
target the entire playing season—rather, spring training and 
 
 92 Id.; see Ben Giles, Major League Baseball Wants Players Exempt from Minimum 
Wage Law, ARIZ. CAPITOL TIMES (Jan. 23, 2019), https://azcapitoltimes.com/news/2019/
01/23/major-league-baseball-wants-players-exempt-from-minimum-wage-law. 
 93 That is, teams travel across state lines, nation and region-wide, to play the various 
teams in their division or league. 
 94 Senne, 934 F.3d at 933 n.8. 
 95 Id. at 952 n.2 (Ikuta, dissenting) (“The California class was defined as ‘[a]ny 
person who, while signed to a Minor League [UPC], participated in the California League 
on or after February 7, 2010, and had not signed a Major League [UPC] before then.”). 
 96 See The History of the California League, MILB.COM, https://www.milb.com/
california/history; see also Midwest League, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Midwest_League (listing sixteen teams spanning seven states: Illinois; Indiana; Iowa; 
Kentucky; Michigan; Ohio; and Wisconsin). 
 97 Senne, 934 F.3d at 952 n.1 (Ikuta, dissenting) (“The Florida and Arizona classes 
were defined (respectively) as including ‘[a]ny person who, while signed to a Minor 
League [UPC], participated in spring training, instructional leagues, or extended spring 
training in [Florida or Arizona] on or after Feb 7, 2009, and had not signed a Major 
League [UPC] before then.’”). 
 98 Id. at 933 n.8. 
 99 Id. at 932. 
 100 Id. at 944. 
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instructional league play—but are equally, if not more, fruitful: while 
more transient, it is work uncompensated entirely as it stands today.101  
To be successful, players in the California class must first show that they 
have worked certain hours as employees and then that those hours were 
improperly deemed overtime exempt.102  Meanwhile, the Arizona and 
Florida classes must merely show that players have worked at all, and 
nothing more, to receive the pled compensation.103  Fortunately, 
California has expansive definitions of “employ” and “hours worked” to 
help players meet the state’s more stringent burden.104  And absent a 
convincing reason to adopt the federal standard (which, as we know, 
eliminates substantial protections to players), California does not 
import it—another big positive for players.105  Less liberal states are 
split, however, with respect to their incorporating the FLSA:106 Arizona 
is silent on incorporation, and Florida expressly incorporates.107  At any 
rate, state law is poised to prove decisive in Senne. 
Keen on this, MLB is actively petitioning states to pass legislation 
that matches federal law.108  And as a “major component of commerce 
and tourism, . . .” state legislators appear increasingly submissive to the 
motivations of MLB.109  For example, Arizona recently introduced a bill 
to exempt minor leaguers from the state’s minimum wage, despite “a lot 
of effort” being required to revise the current law.110  Of note, the bill 
contained an antagonistic “retroactivity clause” to negate Senne’s 
remaining thrust.111  Therefore, as MLB continues to stymy the mission 
of its minor leaguers through sheer financial leverage, a consensus on 
the attainability of state compensation remains unknown. 
 
 101 Id. at 942. 
 102 Id. at 944. 
 103 Senne, 934 F.3d at 942.  
 104 Id. at 945–46. 
 105 Id. at 945 n.25. 
 106 Id. 
 107 Id. 
 108 Mitchell Atencio, Major League Baseball Wants Exemption from Arizona’s 
Minimum Wage Law, ARIZ. CENT. (Jan. 24, 2019, 6:00 AM), https://www.azcentral.com/
story/news/politics/legislature/2019/01/24/mlb-wants-arizona-exempt-minor-
league-players-minimum-wage-laws/2662327002. 
 109 Id. 
 110 Id. 
 111 Id.  
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V.  IMPLICATIONS OF SAPA: MUSINGS & EXTRAPOLATIONS 
The SAPA “roadblock,” and its impact on Senne, is consequential to 
both tracks of the professional baseball system—affiliated and 
independent.  Unfortunately, the latter faces looming extermination, 
and the former is merely confronted with the devil it already knew (i.e., 
grossly unfair wages with respect to time spent working).  Nevertheless, 
both are destined to face inevitable overhauls in the coming years as a 
result of this constricting piece of federal legislation.112 
A.  The Future of Affiliated Compensation  
1.  Out-of-Pocket Pay 
One MLB organization, the Toronto Blue Jays, took the effects of 
SAPA to heart.  Conscious that SAPA could temper the appeal of playing 
minor league baseball, the Blue Jays’ president, Mark Shapiro, declared 
a 50% pay raise “for any player . . . from the lowest rung in the 
Dominican Summer League to the highest level at [AAA].”113  Since more 
minor league players than ever are insulated by the fallback of a college 
education, Shapiro hoped to curtail the risk of players leaving baseball 
prematurely or pursuing outside careers with more stable and quality 
pay.114  He also recognized the “incredibly strong business imperative to 
pay players more.”115  That is, a player who worries less about money 
can eat healthier, sleep better, and practice more.116  In turn, the 
organization stands to make an exceptional return on its investment as 
better-groomed players reach and contribute to the parent club.117 
The raise, unfortunately, is still a far cry from a truly sustainable 
and livable wage; however, on the bright side, players have seen 
pragmatic benefits that they previously considered luxuries.  Of note, 
the raise effectively “allow[s] a player to go from sharing a four-
bedroom apartment to a two-bedroom.”118  Further, it eliminates the 
need for players to seek in-season, part-time work like driving for 
DoorDash, Uber, or Lyft—a prevalent means to supplement inadequate 
 
 112 See Normandin, supra note 65; see also David Waldstein, M.L.B. Said to Be Pushing 
for Overhaul of Minor Leagues, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 18, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/
2019/10/18/sports/baseball/minor-league-changes.html. 
 113 Baer, supra note 15 (“A happy workforce is a productive workforce.”). 
 114 Id.  
 115 Id. 
 116 Id. 
 117 Id. 
 118 Id. 
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weekly earnings during off-hours.119  Unfortunately, to date, the Blue 
Jays are the lone MLB guardian paying sizable out-of-pocket wages and 
longing for the preservation of its minor leaguers.120  While it does not 
yet appear that other teams have taken steps to follow suit in this 
regard, it looks all but certain that modifications to the current minor 
league system are impending in connection with SAPA—though far less 
altruistic ones, to be sure. 
2.  Systematic Overhaul  
As external lobbying in support of SAPA came and went, MLB began 
contemplating a radical internal restructuring.121  The league is 
exploring the possibility of using the expiration of its current operating 
agreement with 160 affiliated minor league teams, set to expire in 2020, 
to reorganize the affiliated system and reform the working conditions of 
minor league players.122  This experiment would include the following: 
(1) a cut to the amateur draft; (2) an upgrade of facilities (from MiLB to 
MLB standards); (3) an adjustment of teams’ geographical proximity to 
one another; (4) an improvement in transportation and hotel 
accommodations; and, most pertinent to this Comment, (5) an increase 
in compensation.123   
But concerns with the proposal have proponents of higher pay 
treading lightly.  Notably, it is unclear how an increase in compensation 
factors into a system with a SAPA-imposed federal ceiling and Senne’s 
evolving state wage pursuits.  Additionally, the current proposed plan 
would facilitate widespread UPC terminations, “eliminat[ing] roughly 
1,400 players, . . .”124 and only benefit the remaining minor leaguers.  
Further, it would be fatal to many minor league owners because the 
proposal directly affects the cachet and financial attraction of owning 
and operating a team—will it still exist tomorrow?125  Along with the 
forty-two teams directly targeted in the restructuring,126 many others 
stand to “wither away” per the financial inability to sustain the new 
 
 119 Stephanie Apstein, Meet Peter Bayer, the Minor Leaguer Working for DoorDash 
During Baseball’s Coronavirus Suspension, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Mar. 14, 2020), 
https://www.si.com/mlb/2020/03/14/minor-leaguer-doordash-coronavirus (“Like 
many minor league baseball players, Bayer earns the bulk of his income from doing 
things other than playing baseball.”). 
 120 See Baer, supra note 15. 
 121 See Waldstein, supra note 112; see also Brown, supra note 13. 
 122 Waldstein, supra note 112. 
 123 Id.   
 124 Id. 
 125 Id. 
 126 Id. 
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model moving forward.127  A revenue-sharing plan has been rumored to 
offset this possibility,128 but the credibility of that intention remains to 
be seen.   
The origins of this hypothesized new model stem, in part, from 
MLB’s response to the highly criticized lack of player compensation and 
substandard work environments that Senne voiced and SAPA 
silenced.129  President and CEO of MiLB, Pat O’Connor, commented on 
the budding dissonance between MLB and MiLB, “There’s an array of 
emotion.  [We’re] concerned.  [We’re] angry.  [We’re] disappointed.  We 
thought we had a partnership . . . stronger than this.”130  Blaming MiLB, 
MLB maintains that MiLB has “indicated that [it] would prefer to simply 
eliminate franchises.”131 rather than “[foot] cost increases for improving 
facilities, working conditions and pay.”132  In essence, MLB cornered 
MiLB between a rock and a hard place: it must either pour the limited 
funds it has into saving teams or cut them entirely. 
Maybe, then, with so many players looking for a place to play, 
independent professional baseball could become a haven for 
unemployed affiliated players.  Perhaps SAPA did nothing at all to “save” 
minor league baseball except for unintentionally sanctify the 
independent circuit.  While it is an inviting consolation, the implications 
of SAPA appear much graver for the independent side of the ledger—
and they come without any opportunity for out-of-pocket compensation 
or showy restructuring efforts to cushion the fall. 
B.  Death to Indy Ball  
An independent track that is deprived of significant overhead 
capital is naturally confronted with a much bleaker outlook in response 
to SAPA: its mortality.133  Unlike affiliated players provided a marginal 
increase in monthly salary under SAPA, independent professional 
players are entitled to a much bigger jump in pay because their baseline 
earnings are less than that of their affiliated counterparts.134  As part of 
 
 127 Id. 
 128 Waldstein, supra note 112. 
 129 Id. 
 130 Id. 
 131 MLB Says It is Committed to Protecting Minor League Teams, STAR TRIBUNE (Dec. 28, 
2019), https://www.startribune.com/mlb-says-it-is-committed-to-protecting-minor-
league-teams/566538502. 
 132 Id. 
 133 See J.J. Cooper, End Of Indy Leagues?, BASEBALL AMERICA (March 22, 2018,  
11:21 AM), https://www.baseballamerica.com/stories/save-americas-pastime-act-
could-wound-or-kill-indy-leagues. 
 134 Normandin, supra note 65. 
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the “small business side of baseball,”135 the independent leagues are 
quite vulnerable to any mandated increase in wages; owners are not 
equipped to pay their players a minimum wage, federal or state.136  The 
first domino fell in November of 2019 when the five-team Canadian-
American Association merged with the nine-team Frontier League137—
a “major shakeup in the independent baseball landscape.”138  For better 
or worse, it is apparent that Indy Ball was a more stable entity without 
SAPA.139   
While SAPA is merely a “safe harbor” at present—allowing teams 
to benefit from it if they so choose—it would have devastating 
consequences on independent organizations if it were made an 
affirmative requirement.140  Factoring in the promise of Senne’s ongoing 
state-law efforts and MLB’s proven and unrelenting indifference toward 
the indispensability of its minor league system, a concerted effort by 
MLB to make SAPA mandatory is foreseeable.141  If so, this obligation 
would drive “most, if not all, of the independent leagues out of 
business.”142  The Frontier League provides players a meager salary of 
$725 per month,143 meaning that it would have to raise its wages by 60% 
to reach the $1,160 standard set by SAPA—an unrealistic expectation.144  
Intriguingly, the Atlantic League generates enough revenue such that it 
is “unlikely to see its salary structure altered significantly under the new 
setup,” and could plausibly seek to monopolize the independent 
landscape by poaching newly unemployed players and paying them 
higher wages.145  But aberrations aside, independent baseball does not 
 
 135 Id. 
 136 Id. (“[T]he salary caps for entire [independent] teams could very well be less than 
what some people reading this sentence make in a year.”). 
 137 Chad Lindskog, Frontier League Announces Merger with Can-Am League, 
EVANSVILLE COURIER & PRESS (Oct. 16, 2019, 3:30 PM), https://www.courierpress.com/
story/sports/baseball/otters/2019/10/16/frontier-league-announces-merger-can-
am-league/3977863002. 
 138 Ballpark Digest Editors, Can-Am League, Frontier League Merger Announced, 
BALLPARK DIGEST (Oct. 16, 2019), https://ballparkdigest.com/2019/10/16/can-am-
league-frontier-league-merger-announced. 
 139 See Cooper, supra note 133.  
 140 Nathaniel Grow, The Save America’s Pastime Act: Special-Interest Legislation 
Epitomized, 90 U. COLO. L. REV. 1013, 1044 (2019). 
 141 See id. at 1015–16. 
 142 Id. at 1043.  
 143 Normandin, supra note 65. 
 144 See Grow, supra note 140, at 1043–44.  
 145 Normandin, supra note 65 (“[T]he Atlantic League is still succeeding because it 
generated enough revenue to pay players and deal with workmen’s compensation 
insurance.  If anything, the league could grow as independent baseball competition 
begins to die, because now there will be voids around the country to fill.”). 
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compete with, or directly profit, MLB in any meaningful way.146  Thus, it 
is seen as an unsympathetic victim to SAPA.147  Death to independent 
baseball, from MLB’s perspective, is like a tree falling in a forest—would 
it even make a sound?  
The presumption that a corporate juggernaut like MLB has little 
pecuniary incentive to look out for the independent circuit is misguided, 
however.  SAPA-induced extermination will have a disparate impact on 
small-town America—the heart of minor league baseball—where fewer 
MLB teams are located and the populations of minor league teams 
soar.148  Of course, while MLB lobbyists did not factor in supporters of 
the “Sugar Land Skeeters or Sonoma Stompers,”149 an estranged 
independent community—presumably those who are, first and 
foremost, fans of baseball—could have an indirect strain on the 
profitability of MLB.150  Less contact with live baseball will flat-line 
enthusiasm in certain regions of the country, and the next generation of 
young players will begin choosing other sports at a rate even faster than 
they already are.151  MLB has had little reason to care much about its 
image or development in recent years because it has been relishing in 
record revenue and capitalizing on a generation of consumers who 
revere the sport with unconditional adoration.152  Now, however, fans 
and aspiring players alike have been enlightened to the exploitation 
characteristic of minor league baseball,153 and only time will tell how 
that realization bodes for MLB.   
 
 
 
 146 Id. 
 147 See id. 
 148 Cooper, supra note 133 (“I tell you who gets hurt the worst, it’s not only the 
players . . . .  They lose out because they don’t have the opportunity.  The other who loses 
out is these communities with 1,000 seat ballparks.  It’s a cheap night out for local 
families.”). 
 149 Normandin, supra note 65. 
 150 Bob Cook, Even More Reasons Why Children Are ‘Abandoning’ Baseball, FORBES 
(May 22, 2015, 5:39 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/bobcook/2015/05/22/even-
more-reasons-why-children-are-abandoning-baseball/#14936fc23e82 (“[T]he Great 
American Pastime [may] become the Great American Nichetime.”). 
 151 Id. 
 152 Kari Paul, Why the Biggest Battle in Major League Baseball is Happening Off the 
Field, MARKET WATCH (Feb. 27, 2017, 10:36 AM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/
5-ways-mlb-is-trying-to-get-younger-fans-interested-in-baseball-2017-02-22. 
 153 Dirk Hayhurst, An Inside Look into the Harsh Conditions of [MiLB], BLEACHER REPORT 
(May 14, 2014),  
https://bleacherreport.com/articles/2062307-an-inside-look-into-the-harsh-
conditions-of-minor-league-baseball. 
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Though the downstream appraisal of MLB misfeasance is 
speculative for now, the uncertainty presently surrounding Indy Ball 
only crystallizes the facade of SAPA.154  As the state of independent 
baseball buoys, those that value the sport as entertainment (fueling the 
origins of the Seasonal Exemption, to begin with) are, for the first time, 
forced to consider the underlying compensatory shortcomings of those 
who actually do the entertaining: the players.  The eradication of Indy 
Ball altogether—along with its invisible conditions—could be cleansing 
for the sport writ large,155 but its demise would undoubtedly create 
large “voids around the country” for legions of devoted baseball fans.156  
Forever subjected to the hypocrisy of a law that proclaims to save 
baseball, MLB would, without reservation, bear that cross.157   
VI.  CONCLUSION 
MLB has been fluent in profit for well over a century, but few 
realized it had the insensitivity to tyrannize its very own players.  Most 
notably, MLB snaked the passage of misleading federal legislation titled 
“Save America’s Pastime Act” as a proxy for magnificent greed at the 
expense of its minor league system.  And while victory at the federal 
level for pay-protesting litigants has become all but futile, state wage 
laws may prove a viable alternative for those represented in Senne.   
But, win or lose, SAPA has accelerated the denigration of minor 
league baseball and given rise to turmoil on both sides of the ledger.  The 
possibility of elimination confronts a major portion of the independent 
track, meaning less baseball to be celebrated nationwide and even fewer 
opportunities for players to make it big.  Moreover, the affiliated track 
is unlikely to bridge that gap as it is slated for considerable downsizing 
in the coming years.   
Despite all this, fans of the game should look fondly upon the grit 
exemplified by its minor leaguers in the face of a self-indulgent parent 
company.  By utterly failing to account for and appropriately value its 
future players, MLB has forsaken a “priceless” maxim long preceding 
even our national pastime: know thyself.   
 
 
 154 Normandin, supra note 65. 
 155 Id. 
 156 Id. 
 157 See id. 
